Abstract: I identify and quantify the mortgage supply effect of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), a law mandating that banks help provide credit in lower-income neighborhoods, by exploiting a discontinuity in the selection rule determining which census tracts CRA targets. Using a comprehensive source of micro data on MSA mortgage applications, I find that CRA affects bank lending primarily in large MSA's, where banks are most scrutinized. The analysis indicates that CRA's effect on bank originations was about 4% between 1994 and 1996, and expanded to 8% in 1997-2002, consistent with the timing of a reform strengthening CRA. I provide some evidence that marginal loans go to atypical, potentially higher-risk borrowers. The results also indicate net "crowd-in": lending to targeted tracts by unregulated institutions rises in post-reform years, in particular to those areas that have had relatively low home purchase volume in the recent past, consistent with a model of information externalities in credit markets. Finally, using changes in tract eligibility status following the release of Census 2000 data as an additional source of variation, I find that CRA increased bank lending to newly targeted tracts in large MSA's by 4-5% in 2004 and 2005. 
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Introduction
The U.S. government has long intervened in credit markets to improve credit access.
Economic and sociological theories suggesting that credit access and homeownership generate important individual and social benefits such as improved self-esteem and child outcomes, This paper utilizes a simple yet compelling strategy for identifying CRA's impact. I take advantage of a discontinuity in CRA's eligibility rule to identify its effect on credit flow in targeted neighborhoods. CRA targets census tracts with a median family income less than 80% of its MSA's median family income, hereafter "low and moderate income" (LMI) tracts. This rule provides the basis for a regression discontinuity (RD) design where the essential idea is that tracts just below and above the cutoff are identical except for CRA-eligibility and so a substantive difference in lending across the two groups can be attributed to CRA. Given the 1 See Haurin et al (2003) for a review of the economics literature, and Kubrin and Squires for an example from the sociology literature 2 See Li (2005) for an overview of these trends and potential causes.
considerable transformation of financial markets over the past two decades, the importance of exploiting this discontinuity to identify CRA's effects cannot be overemphasized.
Policy makers have recently debated CRA fiercely (Golberg 2000 , Chen 2004 ) and it will likely re-emerge as policy makers rethink mortgage market regulations and policies to avoid future crises (e.g. Bowyer 2008 ). This paper informs this debate not only by providing estimates of CRA's effect on bank (regulated) lending, but also its indirect effect on non-bank (unregulated) lending. While CRA may spark increased bank lending, crowd-out of non-banks could negate these benefits. On the other hand, non-bank lending could increase if targeted neighborhoods improve or information spillovers exist (e.g. Lang and Nakamura 1993), a frequently cited rationale for government intervention in credit markets (Lacker 1995) .
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More broadly, studying CRA may yield insights into the costs and benefits of expanding credit supply. For example, CRA could provide an experimental framework to study the impact of credit access on crime (e.g. Garmaise and Moskowitz 2006) . And measuring the performance and profitability of marginal CRA mortgages could improve our understanding of the sustainability of increased lending and homeownership, and as a result also provide evidence on the competitiveness of the banking industry, a key regulatory issue as this industry consolidates.
To implement the analysis, I use comprehensive mortgage application data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). For all MSA's between 1994 and 2002, I find that bank mortgage origination volume was 3% higher in LMI tracts at the cutoff. Further analysis reveals that CRA's impact is concentrated entirely in large MSA's, where banks are most likely to be heavily scrutinized by regulators and community groups. In this subsample, the discontinuity in bank lending grows from 4% between 1994 and 1996 to 8% between 1997 and 2002 , consistent with a reform implemented by 1997 strengthening CRA. 4 Notably, this reform added incentives for banks to target LMI households and in a companion paper (Bhutta 2008a) using a similar RD strategy I find that CRA's effect on this margin is also concentrated in large MSA's.
For non-banks, I find evidence of "crowd-in". In large MSAs in post-reform years, I find non-bank lending increased by 3%. Further, the increase in credit by unregulated lenders is concentrated in tracts that have had relatively low previous home sales, while the discontinuity in 3 Caplin and Leahy (1998) develop a similar model in the context of retail development in New York City. 4 Zinman (2002) uses this reform to help identify his study of CRA's effect on small business lending.
bank lending occurs in both low and high sales tracts. These results are consistent with a model of information externalities inhibiting credit flow in thin markets (see Section 3).
It is important to note that these results are sensitive to controlling for MSA and tract size. However, conditional on MSA and tract size, other covariates that explain an additional 20-25% of the variation in loan volume are very well-balanced across the cutoff, making a strong case for a causal interpretation of the results. Also important to this interpretation, the RD strategy does not readily identify discontinuities at non-CRA points.
Finally, I take advantage of the change in LMI status of some tracts following the release of 2000 Census data by formulating a "two-dimensional" regression discontinuity design -the change in treatment status depends on two variables instead of one -to assess the effects of CRA in 2004 and 2005. While summary statistics reveal extraordinary growth in loan volume in "switching" tracts, indicative of the explosion in credit supply at this time, the RD strategy identifies a modest effect of CRA on bank lending of 4-5% to these tracts. As this finding is for a set of newly targeted census tracts, it strengthens the causal interpretation of the earlier results.
In the next section, I discuss CRA in more detail and review previous research trying to identify CRA's effect on credit supply. Section 3 describes CRA's potential effects, including a short discussion of the information externality model. Section 4 discusses the data and regression discontinuity strategy. Section 5 presents the results and discusses the "twodimensional" regression discontinuity approach, and Section 6 concludes.
Background & Related Literature
Congress passed the CRA in response to claims that banks were continuing to irrationally redline low-income, urban neighborhoods. 5 To ensure that banks and thrifts (hereafter banks) supply credit in both higher and lower income neighborhoods within their operating market, regulators periodically inspect their lending records. Importantly, CRA does not cover nondeposit independent mortgage companies or credit unions. And, CRA does not automatically cover non-deposit mortgage subsidiaries of banks, but banks have the option of including their subsidiaries' lending in their CRA evaluation.
Examiners rate banks in each of their "assessment area(s)" -generally the MSAs and/or counties where they have branches -separately and then combine these ratings into an overall grade (e.g. outstanding, needs to improve, etc. Community organizations also play a role in enforcement. Regulators must solicit and weigh public comments on a bank before deciding on its merger application. Community groups can and often do use the HMDA data and other resources to build a case against a bank. A major component of the CRA evaluation is a bank's volume of lending to LMI neighborhoods compared to that of its peers as well as to the bank's non-LMI lending volume.
Regulators therefore give banks "CRA-credit" as a discontinuous function of tract income.
Therefore, to identify CRA's effect, I will measure the jump in loan volume at the point where CRA-credit jumps.
6 Banks define their assessment area for CRA evaluations. 7 Banks with an exam scheduled between January 1, 1996 and June 30, 1997 had the option of being evaluated under the old CRA criteria. Most took that option suggesting the new standards were more rigorous (Thomas 1998 Another concern is that reductions in underreporting during the 1990's likely inflate loan growth for independent mortgage companies more so than for banks (JCHS 2002) .
Berry and Lee's (2008) approach is most similar to the one taken in this paper. They create a set of "matched pair" neighborhoods -pairs of tracts sharing a physical boundary where one tract is just above the CRA threshold and one just below. They then calculate the average pair-difference in several credit outcomes, controlling for the pair-difference in the "assignment variable" (tract-to-MSA median family income). BL fail to find evidence of a treatment effect, but their matched-pair design generates very imprecise results. For instance, the implied percentage effect of CRA on origination volume from their design is roughly between -17% and 10 They also exploit variation across MSA's in CRA Agreements. As the authors acknowledge, this strategy also does not have a causal interpretation since MSA's where banks sign into agreements are likely to be different from other MSA's and CRA agreements locations may be endogenous.
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. 11 The strategy in this paper uses the data much more efficiently, allowing important exploration of heterogeneous effects over time and across space, while maintaining a causal interpretation.
Berry and Lee also test whether CRA affects credit supply to LMI borrowers. Again, they exploit the CRA discontinuity, testing for a discontinuity in loan rejection rates and find no effect. Their test assumes that banks respond to CRA by lowering credit standards, which may not be the case (see Section 3). Even if banks do lower credit standards, testing for a discontinuity in the denial rate will be biased if average applicant credit quality changes in response. For instance, more high-risk types might apply as the probability of acceptance rises.
Indeed, Canner et al (1999) shows that during the 1990's, the expansion of subprime credit led to an increase in credit supply and denial rates. Both in this paper and its follow-up (Bhutta 2008a), I detect a jump in application volume at the CRA cutoff, calling into question Berry and Lee's assumptions.
Neighborhood Credit Supply and the CRA
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Two types of lenders generally supply mortgage credit: banks, which take deposits, and mortgage companies (non-banks) that get loanable funds from a secondary market of investors.
Roughly, banks serve prime (low-risk) borrowers, while non-banks provide FHA (government insured) and subprime loans in addition to conventional prime loans (Nichols et al 2005) . The availability of prime, FHA and subprime mortgages suggests that a variety of risk types can obtain credit (Pennington-Cross et al 2000) . Still, a large fraction of applications are denied indicating that many may have difficulty obtaining a mortgage.
The effect of CRA on targeted-neighborhood credit supply depends on how banks respond to CRA. Banks may attract applications away from non-banks, for instance through increased neighborhood advertising or by providing incentives to mortgage brokers and real estate agents to recommend customers to them, leaving credit supply basically unchanged.
Alternatively, banks may offer credit at a lower price in targeted areas. Some crowd-out may occur, but an overall increase in credit flow would result as demand would rise in response and more borrowers would meet payment-to-income ratio requirements. This scenario would 11 Calculated as the point estimate +/-two times the standard error (see Berry and Lee's Lang and Nakamura (L-N 1993) provide a more subtle reason for "crowd-in". They hypothesize that increased home sales generates public information about neighborhood home values that can increase appraisal precision and lead to greater equilibrium credit supply.
Uncertainty about home values negatively affects credit supply even if lenders are risk neutral because of the asymmetry in payoffs: expected gains due to undervaluation fail to offset expected losses due to overvaluation. The public nature of home transaction information diminishes lenders' incentive to gain experience in neighborhoods through more lending. Thus, neighborhoods experiencing a negative shock to home sales in one period might suffer suboptimal credit supply in subsequent periods due to this information externality.
A few studies establish a positive relationship between home sales in one period and subsequent credit access, but none have a quasi-experimental setup. 13 This study may provide evidence of the L-N hypothesis by taking advantage of the shock to home sales induced by CRA, combined with data on historical tract-level sales volume. Specifically, if the L-N hypothesis is true, then an increase in bank home purchase loans due to CRA should have a greater subsequent effect on non-bank home purchase lending in previously low-sales areas than in high-sales areas.
Data & Empirical Strategy
Overview
I take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in the CRA eligibility rule to identify its impact on credit flow. Census tracts with a median family income less than 80% of MSA median family income qualify as "low-and-moderate" income (LMI) under CRA regulatory procedures and are targeted by banks. In the regression discontinuity (RD) analysis that follows, this income ratio (TM) is the "assignment" (or "running") variable. The impact of the CRA at the cutoff will be identified by measuring the jump in loan volume at TM = 0.80.
Importantly, the value of TM used in this paper is identical to that used by bank which extend a very small share of mortgage credit, are included in this last group because they also fall outside the reach of CRA. I also use the census tract of the property, the loan amount, the disposition of the loan (e.g. approved, originated, denied, etc.), the loan purpose (e.g. refinance), and whether the loan was sold in the secondary market and to whom it was sold.
Finally, lenders report some borrower characteristics such as race, gender, and income, which I use to measure changes in portfolio risk. See Table 1 Column 4 provides the p-Value for a test of the equality of the means in columns 2 and 3. Summing all loans by all lenders, total loan volume for median income tracts is around 30%
higher than for the CRA-ineligible group and more than 60% higher than the CRA-eligible group. The differences in terms of owner-occupied housing units are 18% and 39%, respectively. In fact, substantive differences across the cutoff occur for nearly all the housing and demographic variables in panel B. The regression discontinuity strategy discussed next provides a reliable way in theory to deal with the apparent selection problem when trying to identify the impact of CRA.
Regression Discontinuity
Consider the following tract-level regression of potential outcomes (e.g. log total
originations by banks between 1994 and 2002) on a CRA treatment indicator variable,
The essential premise of the regression discontinuity design is that:
In words, CRA targeted and not-targeted tracts arbitrarily close to the cutoff (TM = 0.80) are identical in expectation with the exception of their eligibility status. As such, any substantive difference in outcomes across the cutoff for tracts "near" the cutoff can be attributed to a CRA treatment effect. Crucially, under assumption (4.2) the major changes in mortgage markets over the study period and the substantial differences between LMI and non-LMI census tracts do not threaten identification of CRA's effect at the tract-eligibility threshold.
One approach to estimating β is to compare the outcome mean for tracts "just below" the cutoff to that for tracts "just above" the cutoff. But because loan volume is highly correlated with the assignment variable, as illustrated in Table 2 , a more attractive strategy is to model the underlying relationship between loan volume and TM in the vicinity of the cutoff, and β will be To see this, rewrite (4.1) as
And since D is determined entirely by TM (4.3) becomes
And finally, the RD estimating equation is given by
is the "control function" -it controls for the expected value of all excluded variables that affect y and are correlated with D. It will be approximated by linear and polynomial functions of TM.
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Results
Testing the Identification Assumption
If observable, "pre-treatment" tract characteristics change smoothly across the cutoff, that would lend credence to the identification assumption that all tract characteristics affecting lending, except for CRA-eligibility status, change smoothly across the cutoff. Table 2 . 16 Each data point shown in Figure 2 represents the mean of the predicted values for tracts in a halfpercentage point interval of TM. Also shown is an estimated regression line fit to the underlying tract-level predicted values that allows for an intercept shift at the cutoff. Importantly, the set of tract characteristics used explains more than 75% of the variation in tract loan volume and so this test is quite informative about loan volume around the cutoff in the absence of CRA.
A few features stand out. One is the steep slope of the data, reflecting the quick change in tract characteristics over TM around the cutoff. Second, the pattern of the data suggests that the ex-ante relationship between loan volume and TM around the cutoff is approximately linear.
Finally, the data do not indicate any sharp change in tract characteristics at the cutoff. 17 There does appear to be considerable variation in tract characteristics just to the left of the cutoff and near TM = 0.75 that may make estimating CRA's effect more difficult. The top left corner of Table 3 shows the regression result corresponding to Figure 3 , and indicates a discontinuity estimate (standard error) in bank loan volume of nearly 7% (5%). The variance estimates throughout the paper allow for within-MSA spatial correlation. Column 2 shows estimates after including MSA fixed effects. The R 2 increases substantially and the standard error falls by about 25%, but the point estimate is also cut nearly in half, implying that the MSA composition of tracts is not well-balanced across the cutoff. Columns 3 and 4 add in tract-level controls, helping bring down the standard error substantially. At the same time, the point estimates across these columns are stable suggesting that within MSA tracts are comparable across the cutoff.
RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Bank Lending
Columns 5 thru 7 use larger bandwidths to help estimate the control function more precisely. The power gained by using more data will be offset to some degree by using a higher order polynomial control function. In addition, to account for a potential discontinuity in loan 17 The point estimate of the discontinuity in predicted loan volume is nearly 2% and is not statistically significant.
volume due to the GSE Act, I allow for an intercept shift at TM = 0.90. 18 The estimates in Columns 5 thru 7 are relatively precise -all are significant at the 5% level. The point estimates range from 2.7% (Column 6) to 3.8% (Column 3). This stability suggests that the conditional relationship between loan volume and TM around the cutoff is well-behaved. Finally, the higher probability of public scrutiny in large cities may affect the response to CRA of relatively small banks operating in large cities. First, because smaller banks generally operate in a single market, negative publicity in their sole market could be quite harmful. And secondly, smaller banks may hope to position themselves as acquisition targets 22 , and they might be relatively more attractive if a potential buyer can be sure regulators will not place costly delays or conditions on the application because of negative public comments.
Panels B and C show results for census tracts in small (1990 population less than 500,000) and medium (1990 population between 500,000 and 2 million) MSAs, respectively.
After controlling for both MSA and tract size (log number of housing units in 1990) the point estimates in Column 3 show no discontinuity in loan volume, although the standard errors are 18 The GSE Act of 1992 mandates that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make a certain proportion of their mortgage purchases of loans in neighborhoods with TM ≤ 0.90. See Bhutta (2008) for an evaluation of its impact. 19 For instance, I find that in 1997, banks with more than $5 billion in assets (less than 3% of banks) originated nearly 40% of all HMDA-reported single family loans and controlled close to 45% of deposits in MSAs with a (1990) population of less than 1 million. At the same time, the median bank in this size class had branches in 7 different MSAs and had more than 70% of its total deposits coming from MSAs with more than 1 million people. 20 See Goldberg (2000) . The guidelines for evaluating multi-MSA banks instruct regulators to consider the size of an MSA when choosing which of a bank's set of markets to do a "full-scope" review (www.ffiec.gov). MSA bank lending at non-CRA cutoffs -i.e. points where there should not be a discontinuity.
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Each point in Figure 4 represents the estimated discontinuity at the given value of TM using the Column 5 specification of Table 3 . Nearly all of the estimates away from the CRA cutoff fall close to the zero line, indicating that discontinuities in the data are not easily generated. These results also reinforce the causal interpretation of the discontinuity at 0.80.
A discontinuity does appear at TM = 0.75. In testing more than twenty points, it is not surprising to find one statistically significant discontinuity. Probing deeper, I find that preexisting tract characteristics change rapidly around 0.75. Performing an analysis similar to that in Figure 2 , I find a discontinuity in predicted loan volume at TM = 0.75, conditional on tract size and MSA, of -8.4% (standard error of 4.3%). In contrast, this same exercise yields no discontinuity at the CRA cutoff (point estimate of -0.7%). Table 4 shows separate estimates (using the Column 6 specification in Table 3 ) of CRA's effect on different loan types -home purchase loans and refinance/home improvement loansand for two different periods that represent years before and after full implementation of the 1995 CRA reform. As in Table 3 , Panel A shows estimates for loan originations. The point estimate for all loans combined (Columns 1 and 2) is about twice as large in the second period, 23 One exception is that the GSE Act may induce a discontinuity in lending at TM = 90.
consistent with the reform strengthening CRA's effect. 24 The results also show a relatively large effect after 1997 in both home purchase lending (8.5%) and refinance/home improvement lending (8.1%).
Panel B shows estimates for CRA's effect on the number of loan applications to banks.
As argued earlier, applications may react to CRA if banks, for instance, increase their advertising in targeted neighborhoods or borrowers perceive their chances of obtaining a loan to be greater.
Indeed, Table 4 indicates that applications for both loan types do rise in response to CRA.
Finally, Panel C shows estimates for the discontinuity in dollars lent. While the point estimates in Panels A and C suggest that home purchase lending rises by a similar proportion in both number and value, the point estimate at the bottom of Column 4 is somewhat lower than the rise in refinance/home improvement originations (0.081 versus 0.057). This result coincides with anecdotal evidence that community groups push banks to increase the supply of small loans to help provide liquidity to homeowners (NCRC 2005). 
Risk Characteristics of Marginal Loans
An ideal way to discern the risk of marginal loans would be to look at how the distribution of borrower credit scores changes across the CRA cutoff. Unfortunately, borrower credit score is not available in HMDA. Instead, I create a risk measure by using the available loan and borrower characteristics along with application outcomes (e.g. application denied by lender) to predict each application's probability of being denied given those characteristics. Of course, predicted denial probabilities will reflect underlying risk as well as other factors. For instance, high denial rates for minorities could reflect both lower average credit scores as well as lender discrimination.
To estimate the risk of an application, I first run the following regression: where deny jMt is an indicator variable equal to one if application j in MSA M and year t was denied, x is a vector of loan and borrower characteristics, λ is a set of MSA by year fixed effects and the coefficients on x are allowed to vary by MSA and year. (5.1) is run using home purchase applications at banks between 1997 and 2002 with TM between 0.50 and 1.10 and for which a credit decision was made. 26 In this sample, about 18% of applications were denied.
Using the estimated coefficients I generate predicted values and then I identify each application's quintile within its MSA-by-year (predicted) distribution. The predicted values are informative: applications predicted to be in the lowest risk (bottom quintile) have a 15% denial rate while applications predicted to be the highest risk (top quintile) have a 50% denial rate.
The gray bars in Figure 5 show the share of home purchase originations to each of the five risk groups as well as to investors (non-owner-occupiers) in tracts just above the CRA cutoff (0.80 ≤ TM < 0.82). The modal owner-occupying borrower in these tracts is in the middle risk quintile. 27 The black bars show the estimated risk distribution of marginal loans. I generate this distribution by first estimating the discontinuity in the share of home purchase originations to a particular risk group. In other words, I obtain six estimates from six regressions, one for each risk class. And then I calculate the proportion of marginal loans for each risk class implied by these estimates.
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Figure 5 is consistent with notion that marginal loans tend to go to marginal borrowers.
In contrast to the counterfactual distribution (grey bars), the distribution of marginal loans is skewed towards those with the highest ex-ante likelihood of being denied credit. The share of marginal loans for investment units (not owner-occupied), which typically represents greater risk, is also slightly higher than normal. Figure 6 complements the results shown in Figure 5 . This figure is generated in an analogous way to Figure 5 , except that I estimate the discontinuities in the share of loans held or 26 I don't include applications withdrawn before the lender's decision was made. I also drop farm loans and loans with missing or zero loan amounts. I use only home purchase applications because borrower characteristics are more reliably reported compared to refinance and home improvement loans. The variables in x are a set of dummy variables for borrower income (12 groups), amount-to-income ratio (10 groups), race (5 groups) and applicant/coapplicant gender (5 groups; e.g. male/female, male only, etc.). 27 The distribution in relatively high-income tracts is skewed toward low-risk borrowers and vice versa (not shown). 28 For instance, the estimated discontinuity in loan share to the highest-risk group is 0.0077. Further, the approximately 8% effect on home purchase lending (see Table 4 ) translates into 10 marginal home purchase loans per tract by banks between 1997 and 2002. Finally, an increase in the highest-risk loan share at the cutoff of 0.0077 given the 10 marginal loans in total implies that just over 2.5 marginal loans, or 25% of all marginal loans, were made to the highest-risk group.
sold to a particular type of purchaser, information which is available for each loan in the HMDA. Figure 6 indicates that banks hold a somewhat higher share of marginal loans in portfolio, which would be expected if these loans do not conform to the usual standards of secondary market participants. 29 A relatively high share of marginal loans are also sold to other banks and affiliate institutions, consistent with the possibility that banks may use secondary market purchases to meet their CRA responsibilities. Indeed, using data on loan purchases reported in HMDA, I find a 13% discontinuity in loan purchases by banks in large MSA's. Also, importantly, I find that these marginal purchased loans are more likely to be held in portfolio by the purchasing bank rather than resold within the same year of the purchase. 
RD Estimates of CRA's Effect on Non-Bank Lending
The results thus far show that banks have expanded their credit supply -both for home purchase and refinance/home improvement -in CRA-targeted areas. Also, they are getting more applications but do not appear to take on more risk. As mentioned earlier, these results may reflect banks attracting applications away from non-banks. Crowd-out seems especially likely in the case of increased home purchase lending since an underlying good (i.e. a house) must be supplied. I next test for whether bank lending substitutes for or compliments non-bank lending. Table 5 The results for IMCs (Columns 1 and 2) suggest that CRA generated an equilibrium with greater lending. In post-reform years, IMC lending is 3% higher at the cutoff. Importantly, there is no pre-existing discontinuity in non-bank lending -the IMC point estimate for 1994-1996 is 0.006. Also, the modest discontinuity in originations after 1997 does not appear to be driven by any single year. When I divide the 1997-2002 period into two sub-periods (1997-1999 and 2000-2002) , I find a discontinuity in originations of similar magnitude in both sub-periods (the point estimates are 0.032 and 0.033, respectively; both are significant at the 10% level). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show estimates of the discontinuity in bank home purchase lending in low-sales and high-sales tracts. For both groups of tracts there is a similar (proportional) effect. Analogous estimates for IMCs (Columns 3 and 4) show a large discontinuity in home purchase lending in low-sales tracts, but no effect in high-sales tracts.
These results are consistent with predictions of the L-N model.
Exploring Alternative Explanations for Crowd-In
Low-sales and high-sales tracts are different, which may lead to differential effects of CRA for reasons other than an information externality. For instance, the population of low-sales tracts around the cutoff (0.78 ≤ TM ≤ 0.82) is 24% African-American, compared to 13% for high-sales tracts. If minority neighborhoods are better represented by community groups, CRA's direct effect on banks may be stronger in the low-sales group. But Table 6 shows that the discontinuity in bank home purchase lending is similar for both groups, and I also find a similar effect across both groups for home-improvement/refinance lending.
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Another possibility is a differential effect in bank purchases of loans in the secondary market, for which banks get "CRA-credit" if the purchase is for a loan originated in an LMI tract. Interestingly, I find a large discontinuity in bank secondary market purchases -for 1997 and 2002 in large MSAs, the point estimate is 0.125 with a standard error of 0.020. 32 However, I
do not find a difference in that effect across high and low sales tracts. The difference in the point estimates across the two groups is 0.005. 31 Point estimates (standard errors) for the discontinuity in bank home-improvement/refinance lending are 0.077 (0.039) for low-sales tracts and 0.078 (0.021) for high-sales tracts. 32 Again, I use the Column 6 specification from Table 3 and use the log number of bank loan purchases as the outcome variable.
Along these same lines, I test whether non-banks are more likely to sell their loans to banks in low-sales LMI neighborhoods. 33 Specifically, I test for a discontinuity in non-banks'
share of home purchase loans in low-sales tracts sold to banks. While the point estimate is positive, it is very small -0.0035 with a standard error of 0.0024. Likewise, the discontinuity in home purchase loans sold to banks as a share of all such loans sold is similar (0.0053).
A final reason that I explore for increased non-bank lending in CRA-targeted tracts stems from the GSE Act, which establishes funding goals for secondary market institutions Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae (the GSEs). The "Special Affordable Goal" (SAG) in particular targets census tracts with TM < 0.80, similar to the CRA. However, the SAG also requires that the purchased loan be to a borrower with income less than 80% of the MSA median family income to count towards the GSEs' goal.
A few considerations suggest that the SAG will not explain the results thus far. First, I
know of no reason that the GSE Act should have a differential effect in large MSAs. And second, direct tests suggest that the GSE Act's effect on credit supply is small (Bhutta 2008b).
Nevertheless, I test for a confounding GSE effect by measuring the discontinuity in non-bank home purchase lending in low-sales tracts to borrowers with income above the SAG limit. The point estimate (standard error) of 0.103 (0.039) is nearly the same as that in Table 6 (Column 3),
suggesting that the SAG is not driving the earlier results. 
The Effect of CRA on Bank and non-Bank Lending, 2004-2005
In addition to cross-sectional variation in treatment status, TM also varies over time. Lenders do not report information on the lender from whom they purchased a loan in HMDA, but lenders do report information on the type of institution to whom they sell a loan (see Table 1 ). 34 Similar analyses suggest the GSE Act does not affect bank lending either. 
where k indexes the polynomial order. The idea of the identification strategy is to compare the change in lending for tracts that just switched to LMI to those that almost switched into the treatment group -in other words, a difference-in-difference estimate at the cutoff. In order to use more data away from the cutoff, I control for the relationship between the assignment variables and loan growth using (5.4). Table 7 provides group means of various housing and credit flow variables for tracts that Other characteristics in panels A and B provide further evidence of these divergent trends.
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The difference between the two numbers in the first row of Panel C provides a basic difference-in-difference (DD) estimate of CRA's effect -a remarkable 15% despite the fact that switching tracts are getting poorer. IMC mortgage growth in switching tracts also exceeds that in non-switching tracts, again implying crowd-in, assuming the DD estimate is well-identified. Table 8 shows estimates of (5.3). Column 1 provides a DD estimate controlling for MSA and TM old , which lowers the coefficients relative to the baseline DD estimates calculated from Table 7 . Columns 2 thru 6 adopt progressively more flexible control function specifications and include covariates in columns 4 and 6 (see table notes for list of covariates). Controlling for TM new and its interaction with TM old in column 2 reduces the point estimates substantially.
The estimates in columns 2-6 are stable over the various specifications and suggest CRA had a marginal effect of nearly 5% on bank lending. As this result is for a new set of targeted tracts, it bolsters the causal interpretation of the earlier results.
In contrast, Panel B shows that CRA did not affect IMC lending this period. The absence of crowd-in might be explained by the fact that these tracts have just begun being targeted by CRA. Earlier, it was found that CRA did not have an effect on non-bank lending until after 1996. Also, the magnitude of the CRA effect for banks is similar to what it was in the 1994-1996 period (Table 4) , and in these years there is no evidence of positive spillovers to IMCs (Table 5 ).
Summary & Discussion
The CRA is a longstanding and large scale government credit market intervention to expand credit market access in low and moderate income (LMI) communities. Much controversy surrounds this regulation because its impact is not well understood. This paper helps inform this debate by exploiting the fact that CRA targets census tracts below a known income cutoff to estimate CRA's causal effect on mortgage credit flow to LMI neighborhoods.
The results indicate that CRA's marginal effect on bank lending is about 3% on average across all MSAs between 1994 and 2002, but the effect appears to be entirely concentrated in 37 I link 2000 census tracts to 1990 census tracts using the Census Tract Relationship File and keep the set of tracts with minimal boundary changes.
large MSAs where banks are most likely to be heavily scrutinized. Separate discontinuity estimates for small and medium MSAs suggest no impact of CRA, in contrast to a 7% discontinuity in large MSAs. I also find, using a modified RD design, a 4-5% increase in bank lending between 2004 and 2005 in large MSA tracts newly targeted due to the release of 2000
Census data.
Focusing on large MSAs, there is no evidence that increased bank lending crowds-out unregulated or partially regulated lenders. On the contrary, I find small increases at the cutoff in lending by banks' mortgage subsidiaries, which may be due directly to CRA, and by unregulated independent mortgage companies. Consistent with a theory of information externalities hampering credit flow in thin markets, the increase in unregulated lending is found only in a subset of census tracts that have had a historically low rate of home sales.
The estimated discontinuity (standard error) for all loan types by all lenders in large It is unclear whether increased lending by banks in targeted tracks is efficient. While crowd-in by non-banks points to information externalities generating suboptimal credit supply, the CRA seems too blunt to be motivated primarily as a response to this problem. Credit may be undersupplied more generally because of externalities, inadequate competition in mortgage markets or discrimination. Additional data from other sources on longer term, tract-level outcomes such as loan performance, crime and home values could shed light on these issues.
CRA may also be motivated simply along equity lines. In this regard its success may be clearer, although the possibility exists that CRA encourages banks to engage in deceptive ("predatory") 
1994 -1996 1997-2002 1994-1996 1997-2002 1994-1996 1997- Notes: Standard errors clustered at MSA-level shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include MSA fixed effects, tract scale variables and covariates (see Table 2 and text for description), and are run using a bandwidth of 0.30 and cubic control function. Regressions also include variable indicating for TM ≤ 0.90 to control for potential effects of the GSE Act. Table 2 and text for description), and are run using a bandwidth of 0.30 and cubic control function. Regressions also include variable indicating for TM ≤ 0.90 to control for potential effects of the GSE Act.
(1) Means of outcome variables in levels, calculated using tracts just above cutoff (0.80 ≤ TM < 0.82). (2) Adjusted to year 2007 dollars using CPI-U. Table 2 and text for description), and are run using a bandwidth of 0.30 and cubic control function. Regressions also include variable indicating for TM ≤ 0.90 to control for potential effects of the GSE Act.
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